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ABSTRACT
For the approximate two hundred years of their
relationship, the federal government has dictated the life
situation of Indians.

The federal government has vacillated

in both the method and goal in its role as dominate
partner.

Indian tribes have sometimes been regarded as

governments through treaties; viewed as immigrants in plans
of assimilation; and have been viewed as a "primitive
peoples" to be preserved from modern day corruption.
recently,

Most

they have been offered self-determination, - i.e.,

the eventual power to assimilate and to preserve their
heritage as they as Indians desire.

The government,

however, has not relinquished this control easily; if at
all.

This study shows that the government nor the Indians

are completely to blame for the slow progress of the
implementation process of P.L. 93-638.
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INTRODUCTION
Public Law 93-638 is, in reality, a policy of
"termination" of the federal trust Responsibility for the
Native American.

It is not in the same sense as terrible

and traumatic as P.L. 83-280 which eliminated the Indian
reservation as a Federal protected preserve for exclusive
Indian use and handed jurisdiction of services for the
Indian to the state and without consent of the affected
tribes.

This new "termination" policy is of a more

voluntary nature.

It will not only affect the Indian on his

reservation but is currently affecting some of the
"Washington Redskins" on their agencies.
been aptly named:

This policy has

"The Indian Self-Determination and

Educational Assistance Act."
This paper will present some of the facts and will
focus mainly on one government agency, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs or BIA.

The BIA serves the Indian population of

this country and the funds used to administer this policy of
self-determination represent only a small portion of the
agency's budget for each fiscal year (FY).

This paper will

focus on the history of the policy's origination, it's legal
interpretation,

and how the BIA responded to the idea of

giving the Indians self-determination, given the
circumstances that the BIA was in at the time.

Legal History
Historically,

the U.S. Government had two types of

responsibility for the American Indian:

protection of their

property and provision of public services that were not
usually available through regular channels (Congress and the
Nation,

1945-64).

The Indians right to public services was

based on their right to federal protection of their
property.
days.

The protective function dates back to colonial

The public services function dates back to the

beginnings of the United States Constitution.

For many

years the Federal Government protected the Indian from his
own incompetence and improvidence and stood in a guardian
capacity to the Indian (Congress and the Nation, 19451964).

The Government managed most Indian legal affairs

including land, income, law and order and provided most
services to the Indian including health, education and
economic development.
The War Department was the original administrative
agency handling Indian affairs.

The Bureau of Indian

Affairs (BIA) was established in the War Department in
1824.

In 1849, BIA was transferred to the newly established

Department of the Interior; where it remains presently.

In

1955, Federal responsibility for medical and health-related
services was transferred to the Public Health Service in the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Through the years, the Indian has been subject to
2

changing federal policies which varied from patronage, to
total oblivion to the situation, back to paternalism, to the
current one of funded guidance.

In 1934 the Wheeler-Howard

Act brought about the beginnings of current Federal policy
in that it stressed self-determination for tribal
governments; with Federal assistance (Philip,

1986).

In the

1950's, under the Eisenhower Administration, the policy of
termination ended in total disaster for many Indians.

This

Termination Act was an attempt to assimilate Indians into
the non-Indian culture through the dissolving of
reservations and ending their special relationship with the
Federal government.
The July 8, 1970, Message to Congress on Indian Affairs
presented by President Richard M. Nixon contained what is
claimed to be the current official government stand on
Indian Affairs (Congressional Quarterly Almanac,

1970).

It

proclaimed for the executive branch of the Federal
Government,

the Indian's right to self-determination in

tribal affairs and it marked the end of both "paternalism"
and forced assimilation.

In a phrase that became the slogan

of his Indian policy, Nixon called for "self-determination
without termination."

This promise rejected two extremes;

Federal termination on the one hand and Federal paternalism
on the other.

The message called for increased

congressional action on the passing of legislation for
funding and federal assistance of Indian tribal attempts to
gain self-government status.

The federal government,
3

consisting of various councils on Indian affairs, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Office of Economic Opportunity
(0E0) - Indian Desk - and Congressional Subcommittees on
Indian Affairs have historically taken a position of
authoritarian "servitude" to the American Indian.
The legislative movement for the policy began with the
Senate's introduction of Senate Bill S. 1017 in 1973.

When

the bill was first introduced, it had the singular purpose
of reforming the Johnson-0'Malley Act - which is a 193A law
in that the Federal Government or BIA could contract with
states and territories to provide education to Indians.

It

was brought up by the different Indian communities and
advocacy groups that another educational program was not
really needed but one with a stronger contracting authority
that would enable tribes to contract for Bureau of Indian
Affairs and Indian Health Service programs as well as
educational programs (Prucha,

1985).

As a result of

extensive hearings, the scope of S. 1017 expanded to include
all facets of services and programs of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Indian Health Service.
the bill had two titles:

The full version of

Title I contains the self-

determination and contracting provisions.
for the reform,

Title II provided

through self-determination, of BIA

educational services.

When S. 1017 was still in Committee,

most of the amendments made were recommended by the
Department of the Interior and the General Accounting Office
(Congressional and Administrative News, 1975).
A

An amendment

proposed by the Subcommittee on Indian affairs that provided
certain early retirement benefits for non-Indian employees
of the BIA and IHS who would be adversely affected by the
Indian preference laws, was rejected by the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs to whom the bill (S. 1017) was
referred.

As such, the bill was reported out of Joint

Committee on December 19, 1974 and Public Law 93-638 was
signed into law on January 4, 1975 by President Gerald R.
Ford.
Since the process of Indian policy can be quite
encompassing,

this author will focus primarily on the

actions or inactions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
and at times, the Department of the Interior and and Office
of Management and Budget.

There are different constraints

and behavior patterns attributable to the Indian Health
Service, the Office of Indian Education,

the Economic

Development Administration, the Department of Justice and
other agencies unmentioned but they all play important roles
in the Indian policy process but the BIA does bear the
overall brunt of executive responsibility.

The BIA will be

used as a major source of examples in agency patterns and
behavior for the sake of this narrative.
When the author was researching material for this work
he happened to notice some Indian leaders evidently have
more influence than others.

This author's feeling was that

Indians were a powerless lot compared to the steel or oil
interests but some do have some political leverage.
5

There

is an unseen network in Washington that seems to be made up
of tribal leaders, some members of Congress, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the Indian Health Service and components of
the Office of Management and Budget.

It also contains two

or three nongovernment Indian advocacy groups such as the
National Congress of American Indians as well as a lobbyist
or two.

When legislation was in the making, familiar names

would appear again and again.

It is this instance that one

is reminded of a Lowi article in which elite organizations,
leaders and special interests bargain the final outcome of
legislation as well as policy in the distribution of
benefits.
Interpretation of the Law
P.L. 93-638 is intended to reverse longstanding Federal
domination over Indian affairs.

The law reaffirms the

commitment of the Federal government to maintain its
relationship with American Indian tribes and acknowledges an
obligation to respond to tribal expressions for selfdetermination by providing opportunities for "maximum Indian
participation" under the direction and assistance of the
Secretary of the Interior and/or the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare.
Close examination of Title I of the act gives Indian
tribes the opportunity to administer Interior and HEW
programs.

Section 102 directs the Secretary of the

Interior, if requested by any Indian tribe, to contract with
any tribal organization in planning, conducting and
6

administering programs or program segments which BIA is
authorized to administer for the benefit of the Indians.
Section 103 contains similar contracting provisions for
programs administered by IHS under authority of the
Secretary of HEW.

These sections also establish a procedure

by which the Secretary may refuse to enter into proposed
contracts when not in the public interest.

In such cases,

the Secretary must help tribes overcome the obstacles which
prompted the refusal and must provide the tribes with a
hearing and an opportunity for appeal.
Title I also authorizes the Secretaries to award grants
to help tribes develop the capability to operate programs
for which they might eventually contract under sections 102
and 103.

The grants would be used

1)

to undertake orderly planning for the
takeover of the more complex Federallyoperated programs.

2)

to train Indians to assume managerial and
technical positions once the tribe has
assumed control and management of Federal
programs.

3)

to finance a thorough evaluation of
performance following a reasonable period
of time in which a former Federallycontrolled program has been administered
by a tribe under contract.

The other sections of Title I authorized the assignment
of Federal employees to tribal organizations to staff
contracted programs and provide for the retention of certain
Federal benefits for civil service employees who are hired
by tribes and permit contracts and grants for personal
services which would otherwise be performed by Federal
7

employees.

Title I also states that none of the Self-

Determination Act's provisions authorize or require the
termination of any existing trust responsibility of the
United States with the Indian people.
Title II of the act involves a complicated set of
amendments to the old Johnson-0'Malley Act (JOM) primarily
of importance in two areas:

Section 5 provides for the

establishment of a local committee of parents of Indian
children in schools serviced by a JOM contract and section 6
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to pay the full per
capita cost of educating Indian students in public schools
if the students were residing in BIA boarding facilities and
were not regularly residents of the state.
In looking at the federal position on Indian affairs,
one must first define the responsibilities the government
has to Indians and to all American citizens in general.
three branches of the federal government,

The

the executive,

judiciary and legislative all play different roles in the
area of Indian affairs.

Perhaps the most important branch,

administratively, is the executive branch.

The President

has the responsibility of appointing people to represent the
Indian in such areas as the Department of the Interior, the
Indian Desks of the Departments of Health, Education and
Welfare, and Labor and Commerce; as well as the various
councils connected to the White House - such as the National
Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO) in the Office of the
Vice President.

As a result of reports from these different
8

areas, he submits bills to Congress for legislation, so in
that sense he serves as both lobbyist and administrator for
the Indians.

The President is under more of a moral

obligation to help the Indians than a legal obligation.
The judicial branch of the Federal government is
concerned primarily with the individual Indians or tribes
and does not deal with the broad problems affecting the
contemporary Indians as a whole.

The Supreme Court is

involved in law suits involving controversies having to do
with tax, land, water and fishing rights as well as
jurisdictional cases - such as whether an Indian can be
charged with a crime.
Congress is usually recognized as the branch of the
federal government that controls the Indians.

There is,

however, nowhere in the Constitution any explicit vestment
in the Congress that gives it power to control Indians.

In

fact, the subject of Indians and their rights is mentioned
only twice:

"Indians not taxed" were to be excluded from

determining the number of representatives a state was to be
allowed and Congress was to have the power "to regulate
Commerce" with the Indian tribes (U.S. Constitution,

1789).

Congress acts upon bills submitted by the President and
interested Congressmen in the area of Indian Affairs.

Bills

concerning Indian affairs do not always get through Congress
often as a result of poor lobbying efforts on the part of
Indians and due to the fact that the Indians do not have a
strong enough political voice.
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Congress hoped, in essence, that P.L. 638 was the cure
for BIA domination of tribal affairs.

The new Act promised

to transfer Bureau programs contractually to individual
tribes.

It is figured that about once every thirty years

there is a legislative move to end the BIA (Barsh,

1980).

The last time it was tried was during the belt-tightening
years of World War II.

Following this, the Carter

Administration would presume that the BIA would have to
reorganize;

thereby effecting a loss of the position of

commissioner and the "sweeping out" of various department
heads.

This would later prove to be a handicap in the

implementation of P.L. 638.
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IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
On January 4, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford signed
into law Public Law 93-638 (Presidential Documents,

1975).

Bureau of Indian Affairs employees were first instructed not
to emphasize the contracting aspects but merely to work with
tribes who requested grants or assistance by grants to
upgrade organizational and administrative procedures of
their tribal councils (Quetone, 1984).
had contracted for all of 1975.

In fact, no tribes

Many tribes were not

anxious to contract for the memories and horror-stories of
termination of other tribes was still fresh in most leaders
minds.
There are many factors that could and have slowed
implementation of P.L. 638.

First, tribal self-

determination will be a slow, gradual process that may take
a generation or more of cooperation, money and guidance and
yet, there is still the question of it becoming a reality
and reversing a pattern of dependency.

The BIA and its

programs have been a dominant power on the Indian
reservations for more than 150 years and this introduces the
second factor.

P.L. 638 mandates that the Bureau phase

itself out of existence and have its programs and functions
contracted out to the Indian tribes.
for the BIA to adhere to.

There is no timetable

It can and has perpetuated its

own existence by beefing up its staff in implementing and
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advising the contract process to Indian tribes.
Congress has made the BIA and Indian Health Services
(IHS) responsible for the very funding of the programs the
tribes seek to contract.

The Bureau can reduce funding

without, for the most part, tribal consent.

There are no

real measures for evaluation on how well the policy is being
implemented.

In many instances there is no real economic

base that an Indian tribe can turn to except the BIA.

There

have been no definitions of what constitutes the "trust
responsibility"; the BIA can approve or otherwise regulate
the alienation, disposition, encumbrance, management,
development or use of trust resources.

The time lengths on

the contracts are often too short - 3 years - and there is
often annual renegotiation of them which means these
contracts are subject to cancellation at any time.

Third,

along with the lack of time table for the BIA to adhere to,
Congress has failed to consider a planned program of change
(Deloria, 1985).

It has not enacted legislation which would

address the future of many Bureau employees who would be
displaced as a result of the self-determination policy.
Congress cannot be completely to blame if the
implementation of P.L. 638 is thwarted.

The position of

Commissioner of Indian Affairs in the Interior Department
was virtually vacant for 2 years and it was during the
critical implementation stage.

This meant the fabled semi-

autonomous nature of the twelve area offices in the BIA were
at the discretion of how P.L. 638 would be implemented.
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It

would be later discovered in a Government Accounting Office
(GAO) report that:
Some BIA implementation procedures following
the Tribal Resolutions in Intent to Contract
seem overtly designed to cover and threaten BIA
employees unnecessarily.
Massive Reduction in
Force (RIF) meetings are called and announced
in such a manner that job abolishment appears
imminent with the basically simple explanation
that the Tribe is contracting and your job is
on the line.. . . (GAO, 1978: 16)
It was also discovered that though there were many contracts
awarded, hardly any BIA employees were displaced.

A growing

contradiction between policy intent and policy
implementation was becoming evident.
Tribes had begun to report to Congressional Committees,
to BIA and to national Indian organizations that they were
being stifled by complicated bureaucratic procedures in
administering the contracts.

BIA and IHS were not giving

them the information they needed to make the optimal
decisions about which programs to contract and tribal
priorities were being overridden by the Area and Central
offices (Deloria and Lytle,

1984).

Another frequent

complaint was that much time and effort was expended on
contract proposal rewrites to correct deficiencies which
lengthened the contracting process longer than it should
be.

Another was that some employees of the BIA may have

been members of the tribe who were trying to contract and
they would try to discourage the tribe by use of the
bogeyman "termination."
By some estimates almost 40 percent of contract funds
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earmarked for tribal programs were being skimmed by the two
agencies, BIA and IHS, to provide for additional personnel
and various administrative costs before the money ever
reached the tribal contractors.

Congress did not help

matters any when they cut funding for the BIA in FY 1978 and
many tribes contract overhead soon threatened the lives of
different programs with extinction (GAO,

1978).

Another problem to be overcome is the "Indian
problem."

There is a question why Indians want to retain a

separate existence from the White society and maintain their
reservations.
the city.

For many Indians it is a retreat from life in

To live as an Indian is a thought process, a

philosophy that is intangible.

The other part of the

problem are the hundreds of different tribes of American
Indians existing today and each has a ruling body that
governs the daily affairs of the people of that tribe.
some tribes,

In

the ruling body of elders, the tribal council,

possesses an almost totalitarian authority, whereas in
others, the Council is merely a figurehead with the BIA
agency having the most influence (Szasz,

1979).

Many contemporary tribal governments received their
authority from the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 with
some notable exceptions (the Navajo).

Many legal decisions

are made by Tribal Councils which usually play economic,
social, religious roles within the tribe as well as
juridicial.

The councils often share a close personal

relationship with tribal members.
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This concept of

brotherhood and responsibility for others has often brought
about a conflict with non-Indians when it involved legal
problems or the question of tribal sovereignty or for that
matter self-determination.

P.L. 638, in its present form,

is not flexible enough to cover all tribes with varying
economic bases and resources.
Besides Congress,

the Department of Interior, the BIA,

and the Indians there is also the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) that has played pivotal roles before in policy
implementation.

OMB is the "gate keeper" in the interchange

between the executive agency and Congress.

It may not

violate an act of Congress in judging the BIA’s procedures
for implementing policy, but it does make sure to see that
White House policy is not violated either.

It has a large

amount of political power because its position is near the
top of the executive hierarchy, next to the President, and
because it controls personnel positions, budget requests and
administrative procedures among all the agencies.

Being

"high up on the ladder," it is very sensitive to the
political wants of the American electorate.

O M B 's

responsiveness to BIA or Indian needs is in part determined
by the executive estimate of the political importance of
Indian affairs among American voters.

It is common

knowledge that taking a stand on Indian issues is often a
"no-win" situation.
The implementation or lack of it of P.L. 638 can be
traced to factors that plagued its process and progress.
15

First, an organization faced with the loss of power,
personal benefits and prestige will often work counter to
stated policy.

Second, questions are raised about the type

of tactic which an organization will use to advocate their
position.

Third, the lack of leadership in an organization

will create an atmosphere which allows units of the
organization to act independently and counter to the
objectives of an organization.

Fourth, it is suggested that

a comprehensive planning process be implemented if the
change is to be successful.

Fifth, there must be clear

lines of communication between organizations to increase the
chances of success in achieving policy goals.

Sixth, there

must be an agreement of what Indian self-determination means
to each organization and its subsystems (Downs,

16

1967).

INTERPRETATION UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
In the agency’s defense, the program was still quite
new in 1978.

The regulation had been out for only two and a

half years; even though the BIA and IHS had been contracting
some of their programs long before the advent of P.L. 638.
The point that bothered most Indian leaders was that was
their wariness or fulfillment of their longstanding
expectations of incompetence and unresponsiveness about
bureaucrats, especially those working for the BIA (Indian
Town Hall Meeting,

1981).

If the entire self-determination

concept were to be effectively implemented, the number of
BIA jobs would be drastically reduced.

One of the main

justifications for implementing P.L. 638 was that it would
eventually decrease the personnel and expense of Federal
administration of Indian Affairs (Bee, 1982).
Hearing all the criticisms of BIA and IHS handling of
implementation, the Senate Select Committee concluded that
the will of Congress was being thwarted.
decided upon;

Two solutions were

introduce a legislative answer for some of

the contracting processes and hold oversight hearings on
BIA's apparent half-hearted efforts at reorganization.
In 1977, work was begun on a bill (S. 2460) to amend
P.L. 93-638 (Senate Select Committee Hearings,

1978).

The

proposal would make it possible for Indian tribes to obtain
a single block grant for multifaceted tribal programs
17

replacing existing BIA and/or IHS services or any new
programs the tribe might design.

If they wished, the tribes

could continue the contracting procedures set forth in Title
I of P.L. 638.

The block grants would greatly reduce the

amount of proposal writing, accounting, circumvent delays
and other obstacles reported that had become part of the
process in contracting for a service.

However, the tribes

would be required to submit comprehensive plans for use of
the grants and these plans would have to be approved for
funding by the Secretary of the Interior or HEW depending on
which department the program's grant would cover.

To

circumvent earlier problems found by the GAO report it was
stipulated that tribal proposals would be approved on the
basis of established criteria and not on the basis of the
reviewing officials own opinion or priorities.

This,

hopefully, would lessen alleged reports of officials playing
politics with tribal awards.

It would also mean the end of

the agencies' skimming of contract funds to hire consultants
or additional staff without the tribes' approval.
Hearings were held in 1978 concerning S. 2604.

Tribal

support of this amendment and various testimony was given by
different tribes and Indian groups urged passage of the
amendment proposal.
On March 22, 1978, the Federal agencies got a chance to
testify.

Both assistant Secretary Gerard of the BIA and Dr.

Emery Johnson of IHS submitted prepared statements.
opposed the bill and made the argument that the same
18

BIA

objectives could be accomplished using Federal laws already
in the books; including 638.

When questioned by Senator

Abourzek what the problem was, the BIA witnesses stated that
the BIA cannot issue block grants of the type specified in
the proposal until the OMB guidelines have been fully
developed (Senate Hearings,

1978).

IHS felt there were serious administrative problems
inherent in the proposed amendment but given time to make
the proper adjustments it would support the amendment.

OMB

later sent a written answer to the Select Committee and said
that without a test case it could not tell if P.L. 638
regulations could be changed to allow a tribe to combine
both IHS and BIA programs in a single block grant.
S. 2460 was redrafted incorporating some suggested
changes by the agencies and public testimony at the hearings
but elections took up too much time and S. 2460 died in
Committee at the end of the 95th Congress.
reintroduced in the 96th Congress.

S. 2460 was not

The Congressional

attempt to shape up the executive branch’s implementation of
a policy had failed.

From the prepared statements BIA was

not at all pleased by S. 2460's proposed limitations on
staff and operations and it could not and would not be
pinned down to a specific timetable for change.

The BIA

could not be accused of foot-dragging for there was lack of
a test case to draw conclusions from.
The Select Committee had accomplished something for
P.L. 638 reform.

By introduction of amendments, gathering
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agency comments and holding hearings, it began to build a
legislative record for reform measures.

If the advocates of

reform are persistent enough and manage to reintroduce a
revision to policy like S. 2460, Congress has a record on
which to base an opinion.
The House, on June 26, 1978, defeated a Senate-passed
bill (S. 666) that would have allowed non-Indian employees
of the BIA and the IHS to retire earlier and with greater
benefits than other Civil Service workers.

S. 666 was

designed to aid non-Indian employees adversely affected by
laws that gave Indians preference in the agencies hiring,
promotions and other employment practices.

Opponents of the

bill claimed that the bill was a move to give further
preference to Indians and raised the possibility of an
Indian takeover of the agency as non-Indians retired.

They

also claimed the legislation was unfair to other Civil
Service employees who would not get the special benefits as
well as claiming the cost would be unjustifiable (Congress
and the Nation,

1981).

Since there are twenty-six steps to be met in gaining a
contract, many tribes decided they could administer a
program.

During 1977 there were 90 contracts signed.

The

employees of the BIA soon discovered that if the Bureau
continues to contract programs to local Indian communities,
it will eventually be forced to reduce the size of its staff
and maybe even be dissolved (American Indian Studies Center,
1979).

As a result of contracting,
20

the BIA's client

population changes.

It was also at this time the Department

of the Interior and the BIA went through a reorganization.
The position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs was not
permanently filled since 1976 and the position of Assistant
Secretary-Indian Affairs was newly begun when Forrest Gerard
was appointed toward the end of 1977 (Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs,

1978).

With the possible

disappearance of the client population and the BIA without
leadership,

the employees of the BIA were experiencing

distress and massive threat.

Few bureaucratic organizations

have ever been faced with this type of massive threat.

To

make matters worse the BIA was caught in a push for change
from the top - the Congress as well as the President - and
the bottom - the client population - (Taylor, 1983).

The

Congress and the President provided the push from the top by
cutting funding for the Interior and the BIA.

The OMB also

had a hand in pushing fiscally for three funding changes
made in the Interior department and the BIA which still had
a number of vacancies.

No longer needed to operate the

schools or the building of roads, the BIA of the future
would be reduced both in prestige and status.
character of the BIA would have to change.
wonder it went to war with its clients.
fighting for its survival.

21

The entire

It is little

The BIA was

REINTERPRETATION UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
The Reagan Administration has not put forth many new
proposals for a change except to lower many domestic
budgets.

From 1980 to present the Committee has recommended

budget cuts and gotten them.

They did, however, reject a

proposal by the administration to consolidate 10 Indian
programs under a block grant approval (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac,

1981).

When this particular proposal was

unveiled an Indian advocacy group called the National Tribal
Governments called for Interior Secretary James Watt's
resignation because he failed to confer with the plan for
this proposal with its members.

This committee stated that

if the current administration wanted to pursue the use of
block grants, it should first get the support of the tribes
and then try a demonstration project.

Mr. Watt would

eventually resign as of Oct. 9, 1983 for his use of illhumor about his appointees.
Reagan did strike a blow against self-determination by
pocket vetoing S. 2623 which would have authorized federal
assistance for the construction of new facilities at the
Indian schools for the nation's 18 tribally controlled
Indian community colleges; as well as endowment funds.

He

did this on the grounds that the bill contained conflicting
and vague language and the contention that support of the
colleges was not part of Federal Governments trust
22

responsibility toward Indian tribes.

He was also opposed to

spending money at a time that demands fiscal restraint
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac,

1982).

President Reagan more than tried to out do Jimmy Carter
in freeing the Government from the burden of Indian trust.
It almost seems incredulous that he would reiterate what
Nixon said, "Self-determination without termination."

He

had a Secretary of Interior who was almost to the point of
being anti-Indian (Ortiz,

1984).

There may still be a hidden agenda by the Area Offices
which is to stop all contracting and the restoration of BIA
control over all major functions.

Whatever happens, the BIA

must adapt or it will not survive.

Presently this is a

situation that may meet the needs of both parties if they
can resolve their differences.

What is suggested is that

the role of the BIA needs to change from one of parent to
one of being an advisor, colleague and advocate of the
tribe.

If the BIA resists every effort of the people to

work for their own benefit, then the need for the Bureau
will eventually cease to exist.

If the BIA can act as the

chief spokesman for tribal needs and advocate Indian needs
in the Congress and in Congressional Committees and act in
concert with the Tribes by providing quality technical
assistance, the Bureau will survive.
A second possibility for the BIA although not as good
as the first one, is that as Indian Preference in the BIA
increases the number of Indian employees in middle and upper
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Civil Service levels, the BIA and the Tribes can begin to
merge.

The problem with this practice is that Tribal

priorities could be displaced with Bureau priorities and
this solution contains the seeds of potential conflict.
This author mentions these in passing as a temporary method
or beginning of the total process of self-determination.
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EVALUATION
There are many things that have gone wrong with this
policy.

Blame cannot be directed at one single entity.

Congress, in its impatience to end the cost of Indian
administration, has given the BIA more money for new plans
to phase itself out than for the maintenance of old
programs.

The agency periodically prepares for dissolution,

then persuades Congress that Indians are still unprepared to
assume responsibility and must therefore be returned to a
state of supervision.

Has the BIA convinced Congress that

Indians are too poorly trained to manage their own affairs?
Part of the real problem could be because the Indians and
their leaders have never been allowed to control their
economic resources.

When the BIA permits its role as

regulator to be experimentally suspended, it is careful that
no real power over resources is transferred.

By this means,

the expectation of Indian incompetency is inevitably
reconfirmed for Congress (Deloria,

1985).

This study has attempted to cover some of the major
problems that presently face the policy making level of
Indian affairs.

With the creation of the new federal

policy, self-determination, the top level administrators in
Indian affairs are forced into a new position with regard to
their responsibilities toward the Indians.
from role of "Father" to that of "Brother."
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They shifted
This change

calls for an adjustment in attitudes on the part of all
involved.

However, a century and a half of tradition in

administrative relations is not easy to reverse; for the
administration or the Indians.
There is a desperate need for a precise definition of
self-determination.

Everyone wants Indian self-

determination but few agree on its meaning.

The Federal

Government believes that the policy means self-government in
the sense that the tribes become self-sufficient.

The

Indians think that the policy means self-government in the
sense that the tribes become sovereign nations, while
retaining special privileges such as tax immunity and
financial support from the United States Government.

This

is a glaring lack of communication existing today between
the two parties.

Except for some reluctance by the Congress

to part with their dependent "child,"

the Federal

Government sincerely would like to see the Indian nation
self-sufficient and running most of their programs.

This

would certainly take an administrative burden off
Washington's shoulders.

Most Indians want to retain their

special positions and privileges, which are very helpful at
times.

Their goal is to become more self-sufficient within

their tribal units with free governments.

In a conversation

with Professor Sam Deloria there was mention of an Alvin M.
Josephy concept of self-determination which this author
agrees with.

Josephy said that the Bureau of Indian Affairs

must be stripped of its authority over the tribes and
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become, in fact as well as in theory, a service organization
that is limited in its functions to the delivery of
expertise,
request.

services and credit to Indian clients at their
To carry out the trustee function, Mr. Josephy

felt that a special management and legal apparatus should be
created within the Federal Government, separate from the BIA
service delivery organization and responsible to the Indians
alone and charged with a commitment to the trust
obligation.

Its function must be the management of trustee

affairs and the determined affairs and protection of tribal
lands, water rights, mineral and other resources.

Its

relationship to the Indians should be similar to that of a
bank and lawyer to their client and it should have nothing
to do with any other phase of the Indian’s life.
P.L. 638 is designed to be a policy of termination.

It

terminates the Indians dependency on the U.S. Government.
It terminates the BIA and various agencies in the U.S.
Government.

It terminates the second-class citizenship for

the Native American.

It terminates the Indians'

paternalistic relationship with the U.S. Government.
However, no one has taken into account that no agency will
voluntarily let itself be destroyed or fragmented (Downs,
1966).

With this in mind, P.L. 93-638 will never be fully

implemented.
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